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ABSTRACT
This Note argues that an employer’s use of social media sites to “micro-target” potential job
applicants is not per se unlawful under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA).
Rather, recruitment practices that target a specific age group are permissible under the ADEA
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when those recruitment practices are part of a broader recruitment strategy. When analyzing job
advertisements on social media platforms, courts should not only consider the context of the
advertisement, but also whether the advertisements are available through other resources. Such
an analysis would allow employers to take advantage of the streamlined recruitment platforms
available through social media sites, such as Facebook, in order to efficiently recruit new
employees and effectively diversify the workplace.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Meet Daniel. He works at a national retail company and just won employee of the month
for the second consecutive month. He is one of several high-performing employees recently
hired by the company. How did the company find these employees? The company did not place
a “Now Hiring” sign in any of its stores. And it did not hire a professional recruitment agency
during its hiring process. Instead, the company simply posted an advertisement targeted at
specific Facebook users and within 48 hours, it received hundreds of resumes from highly
qualified applicants. 1
Facebook’s job recruitment platform highlights an age-old practice in a new suit: targeted
advertisements in job recruiting. 2 Employers have long understood the benefits of focusing their
recruitment efforts on prospective applicants while the applicants are attending college. 3 For

1

Facebook is a social media site that allows companies to pinpoint Facebook users who view their
advertisements. See Pamala N. Danziger, Facebook’s Advertising Fallacy: That it Works!, FORBES (Aug. 13, 2017,
7:04 AM), https://forbes.com/sites/pamdanziger/2017/08/13/facebooks-advertising-fallacy-that-itworks/#329f37d662e3. One writer described Facebook’s platform as a “win-win for everyone” and serves as a
perfect solution for blue-collar workers who are “afraid to create a LinkedIn profile because of [their] experience.”
Robbie Abed, Why Facebook’s New Job Feature is a Smart Move: Should LinkedIn be worried?, INC. (Feb. 28,
2018), https://www.inc.com/robbie-abed/facebook-is-taking-on-linkedin-with-its-new-jobs-feature-heres-why-thatsa-genius-move.html.
2

What is Targeted Advertising? GCF GLOBAL, https://edu.gcfglobal.org/en/thenow/what-is-targetedadvertising/1/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2020) (“Targeted advertising is a form of online advertising that focuses on the
specific traits, interests, and preferences of a consumer.”).
3
Amy Gulati, Get Strategic About Campus Recruiting, SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
(Aug. 8, 2015), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/talent-acquisition/pages/strategic-campusrecruiting.aspx (“Organizations have long understood the benefits of recruiting on college and university campuses
as a way to attract the best and the brightest. Historically, employers developed relationships with schools as a way
to source niche talent or fill a general pipeline of interns and entry-level hires.”).
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example, employers routinely hold “meet and greets” and conduct interviews that only students
at that specific university are eligible to attend. 4 Generally, this is not considered a form of age
discrimination because, theoretically, older people (i.e., individuals who are at least 40 years
old) 5 are allowed to attend college and would be eligible to apply for such jobs. Nevertheless,
most college students are under the age of 25. 6 Is this situation significantly different from
Daniel’s situation? Daniel saw the retail company’s advertisement on Facebook because he was
within the company’s targeted age range.
Effective recruitment and selection methods are essential tools for businesses and other
organizations to run smoothly and remain competitive. 7 Prior to online recruiting, the most
popular recruitment mediums were local and national newspapers. 8 During that time, employers
also turned to recruitment agencies to screen out unqualified applicants and determine which
applicants to interview. 9 These recruitment agencies, however, were sales-intensive and charged

4

Julie Ellis, From Coed to Corporate Employee: Tips for Recruiting on College Campuses, BUSINESS.COM,
(Nov. 30, 2015), https://www.business.com/articles/from-coed-to-corporate-employee-tips-for-recruiting-oncollege-campuses/.
5

This Note will refer to “older people” as those who are 40 years old and older, which is a protected class
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (stating that “the prohibitions in this chapter
shall be limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of age”).
6

In 2018, 61% of college and university students were under age 25. NAT’L. CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS.,
https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=372.
7
Ruth Mayhew, The Importance of Good Recruitment & Selection, BIZFLUENT, https://bizfluent.com/info8166508-importance-good-recruitment-selection.html (last updated Sept. 26, 2017).
8

Kelly Desormes, The Recruitment Method’s Evolution Throughout the History, J.B.F. NEWS (Sept. 15,
2014), https://www.jobboardfinder.com/news/the-recruitment-methods-evolution-through-the-history/; see also A
Brief History of Recruitment, OPUS., http://www.opusrecruitmentsolutions.com/a-brief-history-of-recruitment (last
visited Feb. 26 2019) (“The initial main tools of recruitment consisted of bulletin board, which led to paid
advertisements in the newspapers.”).
9

Michael Overell, The History of Innovation in Recruitment Technology and Services, TECHCRUNCH,
https://techcrunch.com/2016/10/29/the-history-of-innovation-in-recruitment-technology-and-services/ (last visited
Feb. 26, 2019).
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employers a premium for locating appropriate candidates. 10 Throughout the late 2000s,
employers started managing the recruitment process internally. 11 In addition, employers relied
on online job boards, such as LinkedIn, which allowed employers to post their job
advertisements and purchase access to applicants’ resumes. 12 Although online job boards
provided a cost-efficient method for recruiting candidates, employers often received an
unmanageable number of applications from both over and under-qualified applicants. 13
In 2017, Facebook created an advertisement platform that revolutionized the art of job
recruiting. 14 With over two billion active users, Facebook provides an ideal pool of individuals
who voluntarily provide a myriad of personal information to the social media site. 15 By gaining
access to such information, companies can take job advertising to a new level. This new level,
which is often referred to as “microtargeting,” allows employers to choose their ideal candidate
by selecting who views their advertisements based on the individuals’ skills, interests and

10

Agency recruiters often used proprietary databases, which gave them an information arbitrage over
employers; and as a result, recruitment agencies were able to charge a premium for their services. Overell, supra
note 8.
11

Id.

12

Desormes, supra note 8.

13

Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, The Impact of Emerging Information Technologies on the Employment
Relationship: New Gigs for Labor and Employment Law, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 63, 65 (2017).
14

Julia Angwin et al., Facebook Job Ads Raise Concerns About Age Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/business/facebook-job-ads.html.
15

See Taylor N. Brailey, Article, Discrimination in the Age of Social Media: The New Dangers of Cat's
Paw Liability, 35 J.L. & COM. 271 (2017) (noting that “[o]ften, the personal information shared with those
connections contains details revealing an individual’s attributes that may be protected, such as national origin, race,
gender, religion, age, pregnancy, and disability status.”); see also Reid v. Ingerman Smith LLP, No. CV 2012-0307
ILG MDG, 2012 WL 6720752, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2012) (“Courts have found, particularly in cases involving
claims of personal injuries, that social media information may reflect a ‘plaintiff's emotional or mental state, her
physical condition, activity level, employment, this litigation, and the injuries and damages claimed.’”) (citing
Sourdiff v. Texas Roadhouse Holdings, LLC, 2011 WL 7560647, at *1 (N.D.N.Y.2011)).

5
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background. 16 Facebook’s advertisement platform has dramatically simplified the recruitment
process. 17 Some companies describe this platform as an effective and efficient recruiting tool. 18
However, Facebook’s advertising method has drawn a whirlwind of legal controversies—
especially in the context of age discrimination.
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 19 prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of age against persons forty years old and over. 20 Moreover, the
ADEA prohibits age-related specifications in job postings. 21 Courts have found ADEA violations
where job advertisements deter older workers from applying by including phrases such as
“recent graduate.” 22 Nevertheless, questions remain as to whether a company’s use of
Facebook’s advertisement platform, which targets a specific group of individuals (e.g.,
advertisements that limit the viewers to those who are between the ages of 25-45), violates the
ADEA.

16

Tony Puckett, Digital Discrimination: Targeted Ads Don’t Reach all Potential Applicants, 26 NO. 1
OKLA. EMP. L. LETTER 5 (2018); Larry Kim, How to Use Facebook Ads to Recruit Top Talent, WORDSTREAM:
BLOG, https://www.wordstream.com/blog/ws/2016/08/23/facebook-recruiting (last updated June 19, 2018).
17

Take the Work out of Hiring, FACEBOOK (February 15, 2017),
https://www.facebook.com/business/news/take-the-work-out-of-hiring.
18

Id.; see also Puckett, supra note 16.

19

29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2012).

20

Id. § 631.

21

29 C.F.R. § 1625.4 (2017).

22
See, e.g., Hodgson v. Approved Pers. Serv., Inc., 529 F.2d 760, 766 (4th Cir. 1975) (holding that an
employment agency advertisement directed to "recent graduates" as part of a broad, general invitation to a specific
class of prospective customers coming into the job market at a particular time of year to use the services it offers
does not violate the [ADEA].”).
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Some critics argue that Facebook’s advertisement platform is per se unlawful. 23 In
December 2017, the Communications Workers of America (“CWA”) filed a class action lawsuit
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California against companies who
use Facebook’s advertisement platform for job recruiting. 24 Specifically, the CWA sued TMobile US, Inc., Amazon.com, Inc., and “hundreds of major American employers and
employment agencies” who use Facebook to post job advertisements. 25 In its complaint, the
CWA alleged that the defendants violated the ADEA by targeting their job advertisements
toward certain age groups and therefore limiting the audience for their employment
advertisements on Facebook to younger users. 26 As a result, CWA argued, the targeted
advertisements disparately impacted workers over the age of forty because the defendants
determined who received job advertisements and hiring opportunities solely based on age. 27
CWA’s assertions raise novel issues that must be addressed by the courts. Should courts
hold advertisements that microtarget specific individuals are, by itself, in violation of the
ADEA? On the one hand, microtargeting may cause some groups of individuals to be
categorically, excluded from certain jobs. 28 While on the other hand, microtargeting may

23

See Angwin et al., supra note 14; Suzanne Lucas, Does Facebook Facilitate Age Discrimination in Job
Ads?: Is there a Difference Between Recruiting at a University and Posting a Job Ad that Only 18-30 Year Olds Can
See?, INC., https://www.inc.com/suzanne-lucas/does-facebook-facilitate-age-discrimination-in-job-ads.html (last
visited Jan. 13, 2020).
24
Complaint, Communications Workers of America et al. v. T-Mobile US, Inc. et al., No. 5:17-cv-07232,
2017 WL 6539268 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2017).
25

Id. at *2.

26

Id. at *4–5.

27

Id. at *5–6.

28
See Jeffrey Campolongo and Emily Wisniewski, Age discrimination and Facebook: Micro-targeting
comes under fire, BENEFITS PRO (Jan. 30, 2018 4:01 AM), https://www.benefitspro.com/2018/01/30/agediscrimination-and-facebook-micro-targeting-co/?slreturn=20190127180508 (explaining that the problem with
micrtargeting on social media “is that the end users being excluded from seeing the ads are never given the
opportunity to see or know of the opportunities in the first place. Yes, anyone can pick up a magazine or watch an ad

7
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promote the purpose of the ADEA, especially when the recruitment efforts are part of a broader
recruitment strategy. Indeed, federal courts have ruled that recruitment practices that target
specific age groups are permissible under the ADEA when those recruitment practices are part of
a broader recruitment strategy. 29
This Note argues that courts should adopt a similar, flexible rule when analyzing ADEA
claims in the context of advertisement platforms like Facebook’s. Such a rule would allow
companies to take advantage of the streamlined recruitment platform popularized by Facebook as
part of a broad recruitment strategy designed to reach all age groups. Thus, simply showing that
certain job advertisements directed towards different age groups on sites like Facebook are not
per se unlawful—just like running job advertisements in magazines and on TV shows that target
specific groups of people. Accordingly, if courts adopt such a rule, employers will be able to take
advantage of the abundance of information provided to social media sites to efficiently recruit
new employees and effectively diversify the workplace.
Part II of this Note discusses social media’s impact on employee recruitment strategies
and lays out the legal implications of targeted recruitment advertisements under the ADEA. Part
III argues that targeted recruitment advertisements used on social media sites may promote the
purpose of the ADEA so long as job applicants can sue under a disparate impact theory of
liability. Part IV discusses how federal courts have offered a useful lens to analyze cases that
deal with Facebook’s advertisement platform. Part V concludes this Note.

during the Super Bowl, even if the ad or commercial does not appeal to him or her. But at least that consumer can
process what he or she is seeing, in real time, and make a conscious decision on whether to partake in the goods or
products being peddled.”).
29
See Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., No. 74-536-M, 1977 WL 17, at *7 (D.N.M. Oct. 20, 1977), decision
supplemented, No. 74-536-M, 1978 WL 17 (D.N.M. Sept. 28, 1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds,
639 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1980), aff'd and remanded sub nom. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm'n v. Sandia Corp., 639
F.2d 600 (10th Cir. 1980).
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II.

BACKGROUND

“Americans have gotten used to the idea that ads are crafted to reach specific groups in
specific ways: Ads for beer appear during sports games, while ads for toy stores pop up during
children’s programs. Sites that cull data from users’ behavior and content offer advertisers even
more customization.” 30 These increasingly sophisticated methods of advertising allow companies
to reach a particularly narrow audience and communicate the right message to the right
prospective customer. 31 Indeed, companies have become so effective at reaching specific
individuals that their advertisements may change the way those individuals view themselves. 32
In a similar vein, online job recruitment advertisements seem to pop up whenever you are
on social media, especially when you may be interested in a new job but not actively searching
for an open position. 33 Such an effective system of advertising, however, has not always been in
place.

30

Gillian B. White, When Algorithms Don’t Account for Civil Rights: Do Lucrative Deals with Advertisers
have to come at the Expense of Users’ Civil Rights?, THE ATLANTIC (March 7, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/03/facebook-ad-discrimination/518718/.
31
Elizabeth Mott, Effectiveness of Advertising to a Target Audience, CHRON,
https://smallbusiness.chron.com/effectiveness-advertising-target-audience-80695.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2018).
32

In one study, researchers found that a group of students who viewed an advertisement for a high-end
watch brand—which they believed to be individually targeted to them—evaluated themselves as more sophisticated
after viewing the advertisement. Rebecca Walker Reczek et al., Targeted Ads Don’t Just Make You More Likely to
Buy—They Can Change How You Think About Yourself, HARV. BUS. REV. (April 4, 2016),
https://hbr.org/2016/04/targeted-ads-dont-just-make-you-more-likely-to-buy-they-can-change-how-you-think-aboutyourself (“The data show that participants [in the study] evaluated themselves as more sophisticated after receiving
an ad that they thought was individually targeted to them, compared to when they thought the same ad was not
targeted. In other words, participants saw the targeted ad as reflective of their own characteristics. The ad told them
that, based on their browsing history, they had sophisticated tastes. They accepted this information, saw themselves
as more sophisticated consumers, and this shift in how they saw themselves increased their interest in the
sophisticated product.”); for the full study, see Christopher A. Summers et al., An Audience of One: Behaviorally
Targeted Ads as Implied Social Labels, 43 J. CONSUMER RES. 156 (2016).
33
Social media sites may be effective at appealing to the “passive candidate,” one who is interested in a
new job but not actively searching for one. Todd Wasserman, Why Social Media Should Be Part Of Recruiting —
But Just A Part, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/adp/2018/02/16/why-socialmedia-should-be-part-of-recruiting-but-just-a-part/#37ccc7ca5ca1. One executive stated that these “passive
candidates” demonstrate their talents via social media postings even if they are not officially on the searching for a
new job. Id.

9
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A. Job Advertising Before Social Media
Historically, employers relied on written applications, questionnaires, interviews,

references, and background checks to screen job applicants. 34 From the 1950s to the 1980s, the
most popular tools of recruitment consisted of bulletin boards, which led to paid advertisements
in the newspapers. 35 Indeed, more than 75% of applicants discovered job openings through
newspaper advertisements. 36 During this time, targeted advertising did not exist. 37 With the
exception of age and gender, companies could not separate specific groups of individuals within
the mass audience. 38
After the 1970s, however, social scientists created a new concept: psychographics. 39 At
first, psychographics were primarily used in the marketplace by separating consumers
categorically based on other characteristics in addition to age and gender. 40 Psychographics
considered not only consumers’ age and gender, but also their “lifestyle,” and separated
consumers based on attitudes, beliefs, opinions and personality traits. 41 Once the audience was
segmented in this manner, companies could target specific groups within the mass audience. 42

34

See, generally, Rochelle B. Ecker, Comment, To Catch a Thief: The Private Employer's Guide to Getting
and Keeping an Honest Employee, 63 UMKC L. REV. 251, 255–61 (1994) (describing traditional methods of preemployment screening).
35

Desormes, supra note 8.

36

Id.

37

Id.

38

Roy de Suza, A Short History of Targeted Advertising, ZEDO (May 27, 2015),
https://www.zedo.com/short-history-targeted-advertising/.
39

Id.

40

Id.

41

Id.

42

Id.
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By the mid-1990s, the creation of the World-Wide-Web revolutionized the art of
advertising. 43 The World-Wide-Web allowed employers to pull advertising away from
conventional means, such as newspapers, and recruit candidates from across the world through
online job boards such as LinkedIn. 44 Online job boards allowed employers to post their
advertisements and purchase access to applicants’ resumes. 45 It logically flows that the creation
of the World-Wide-Web, in conjunction with companies’ knowledge of psychographics,
employees would be matched with the most suitable jobs. In practice, however, that did not
happen. 46 While information technology improved companies’ ability to search through
applications, it also immensely increased the number of applications that employers received. 47
In addition, computer algorithms lacked the ability to screen through subjective information,
such as quality, motivation, and whether the applicant was a good fit for the company. 48
B. Job Advertising After Social Media
Social media sites provide a solution for the shortcomings of online job boards and
psychographic technology. Social media advertising is defined as “an online ad that incorporates
user interactions that the consumer has agreed to display and be shared. The resulting ad displays

43

See A Brief History of Recruitment, supra note 8.

44

Id.

45

Desormes, supra note 8.

46

Dau-Schmidt, supra note 13, at 65–67.

47
Id. at 65–66 (“A survey of the 100 most popular job posting sites from 2002 to 2011 showed that in
2011, the average number of job postings on an examined site was 42,063, while the average number of resumes
was 530,743.”).
48

Id.

11
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these interactions along with the user’s persona (picture and/or name) within the ad content.” 49
With the creation of social media sites, companies have taken targeting advertising to a new
level. 50
A major advantage of social media sites is that they are home to a wide range of
information that social media users have voluntarily shared with one another. 51 Companies can
use information voluntarily provided by social media users such as age, geographic location,
education, profession, and personal connections to precisely reach the type of individuals who
are likely to be influenced by the company’s advertisements. 52 This personalized system of
interaction is done by activity and relationship analysis that ensures companies’ advertisements
reach their intended audience. 53 Therefore, companies can lower recruitment costs by efficiently
targeting those who view their job advertisements. 54 This recruitment method, however, has been
welcomed with mixed reactions.

49
Social Advertising Best Practices, IAB (May 1, 2009), https://www.iab.com/guidelines/socialadvertising-best-practices/.
50

This “new level” allows a company to know the interests of each individual whom views the company’s
advertisement. See Louise Matsakis, Facebook’s Targeted Ads are More Complex than it Lets on, Wired (April 25,
2018 4:04 PM), https:www.wired.com/story/facebooks-targeted-ads-are-more-complex-than-it-lets-on/ (“A local
coffee shop, for instance, might understandably target people who already like Starbucks and pages like “Need My
Morning Coffee.”).
51

Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 863–64 (2017).

52

See Social Advertising Best Practices, supra note 48, at 6 (“Consumers of social media actively provide
information to the social domain they are visiting in order to get the most benefit and value from their online
experience as they connect and interact with friends. Some of the information provided to the site is personal, while
some is social or interpersonal. Examples of profile data relevant to social ads include (but are not limited to): age,
gender, location, interests and photos.”).
53
Christian Karasiewicz, 17 Ways Marketers Can Leverage Facebook Graph Search, SOCIAL MEDIA
EXAMINER (July 22, 2013), http://www.socialmediaexaminer.com/facebook-graph-search-marketing/.
54

Id.
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Many companies applaud social media as a recruitment platform because it allows them
to gather an abundance of information about potential job candidates. 55 This information makes
it easier to predict the likely match between the candidate and the prospective job. 56 Indeed, the
ability to send a targeted message to a specific talent pool may be the most economically
efficient method of diversifying a company’s workforce. 57 Consequently, this method of
recruitment may categorically excluded some individuals from certain jobs. 58 As one critic
stated, “[a]d targeting can make the world look different to different people. Some find the web
full of job ads for high-paying CEO jobs, while others see mostly ads for sneakers or pay day
loans.” 59 As a result, this form of advertising may open the floodgates to discriminatory
practices.

55

Puckett, supra note 16.

56

See Ian Byrnside, Note, Six Clicks of Separation: The Legal Ramifications of Employers Using Social
Networking Sites to Research Applicants, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 445, 458 (2008) (“Up to this point,
employers have generally felt that ‘they are on safe ground looking at profiles on MySpace or Facebook because
there are currently no laws stopping them from doing so.’ Furthermore, employers believe they have the right to
obtain as much information as possible about applicants and that using social networking sites ‘is fair game to find
out who will be the ‘best fit’ for their organization’”).
57

Targeted Recruiting vs. Non Targeted Recruiting, DIRECTEMPLOYERS (Dec. 9, 2015),
https://directemployers.org/2015/12/09/targeted-recruiting-vs-non-targeted-recruiting/.
58

David Dayden, Ban Targeted Advertising, THE NEW REPUBLIC (April 10, 2018),
https://newrepublic.com/article/147887/ban-targeted-advertising-facebook-google (“Advertisers armed with Big
Data can ensure housing or employment advertisements don’t reach African-Americans or Hispanics, discriminating
on the basis of race.”).
59

Rachel Goodman, Facebook’s Targeting System Can Divide Us on More Than Just Advertising, ACLU
(April 4, 2018, 3:00 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/racial-justice/facebooks-targeting-system-can-divide-us-morejust-advertising.

13
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C. The Contours of the ADEA
The ADEA prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of age 60 against persons

forty years old and older. 61 The purpose of the ADEA is to “promote employment of older
persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in
employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from
the impact of age on employment.” 62 Employment practices covered by the ADEA include
hiring decisions, discharges, discriminatory treatment in conditions of employment,
discrimination in referrals by employment agencies, and retaliation against employees or
applicants who assert violations under the ADEA. 63
The ADEA is a complement to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter
“Title VII”), 64 which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, religion, gender,
ethnicity, and color. 65 Title VII did not afford protection on the basis of age because Congress
did not have enough evidence of age discrimination in the workplace. 66 In 1964, however,
60

29 U.S.C § 623.

61

Id. § 631(a).

62

Id. § 621(b).

63

Id. § 623(a)(1) (prohibiting an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s age”); id. § 623(b) (making it unlawful for employment agencies to
discriminate on the basis of age); id § 623(d) (“It shall be unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any of
his employees . . . because such individual . . . has opposed any practice made unlawful by” the ADEA or because
that individual “has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding,
or litigation under” the ADEA).
64

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-17 (2012); see also Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination Act, Title VII, and the
Civil Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog that Didn’t Bark, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1093, 1096 (1993) ( “[T]he
[ADEA] and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 have been linked in a common enterprise: combatting bias in
the workplace. This shared goal flows in the first instance from the Acts' virtually identical core proscriptive
language.”).
65

66

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a).

Adam N. Bitter, Article, Smith v. City of Jackson: Solving an Age-Old Problem?, 56 CATH. U. L. REV.
647, 651–52 (2007).
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Secretary of Labor, W. Willard Wirtz, investigated the causes and effects of age discrimination
in the workplace and found that age-based discrimination differed significantly from other forms
of discrimination. 67 In particular, Secretary Wirtz found that age discrimination is usually based
upon mistaken, preconceived notions of ability rather than on feelings of hostility and dislike of
members of a certain group. 68 Rather than amending Title VII, Congress enacted the ADEA. 69
The goal of these two statutes is to eliminate workplace discrimination. 70 Thus, courts generally
interpret the ADEA in conjunction with Title VII because both share the same goal and contain
substantially similar language. 71

67

U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, The Older American Worker: Age Discrimination in Employment 1 (1965), as
reprinted in Employment Problems of Older Workers: Hearings on H.R. 10634, 89th Cong. 201-387 (1966)
[hereinafter “Wirtz Report”]; see also Bitter, supra note 66, at 652 (“[I]n contrast to other forms of discrimination,
employers did not demonstrate animus or intolerance of older workers. However, the Secretary discovered
“substantial evidence of arbitrary . . . discrimination based on unsupported general assumptions about the effect of
age on ability.”).
68

Wirtz Report, supra note 65, at 5–6. Secretary Wirtz also found that certain institutional arrangements,
such as internal promotion programs and pension, adversely affected older workers. Id.
69

See Kimbelye K. Fayssoux, Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and Trial by Jury:
Proposals for Change, 73 VA. L. REV. 601, 605–06 (1987) (observing that Congress’s decision to enact new
legislation rather than amend Title VII “stemmed in part from administrative concerns: the inclusion of age
discrimination in Title VII would have overtaxed the capabilities of the [EEOC]”); see also Note, The Age
Discrimination Act of 1967, 90 HARV. L. REV. 380, 383–85 (distinguishing race discrimination on the ground that
race has no correlation to ability to perform well at a job; whereas, “age is at some point inherently related to
ability”) (emphasis in the original).
70

Eglit, supra note 64, at 1097.

71
See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978) (noting that “the prohibitions of the ADEA were derived
ad haec verba from Title VII”); Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005) (plurality opinion) (stating that
“when Congress uses the same language in two statues having similar purposes, particularly when one is enacted
shortly after the other, it is appropriate to presume that Congress intended the text to have the same meaning in both
statutes.”).
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D. Theories of Liability Under the ADEA
The ADEA establishes causes of action for both disparate treatment and disparate impact

claims. 72 Under the disparate treatment theory, a plaintiff is required to show proof that an
employer intentionally “treats some people less favorably than others because of their [age].” 73
Whereas, under the disparate impact theory, a plaintiff need not show proof of discriminatory
intent. 74 Rather, the plaintiff must prove that the employer used “employment practices that are
facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one
group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.” 75
Specifically, section 4(a) of the ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer:
(1) To fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age; [or]
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of the individual’s age. 76

72

Smith, 544 U.S. at 242–43 (2005); Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61, 69 (3d Cir. 2017)
(“ADEA claims may proceed under a disparate-impact or disparate-treatment theory.”)
73

International Bhd. of Teamsters v United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 (1977).

74

Id.

75

Id.; see also Segar v Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“Disparate impact aims at discovery
and elimination of facially neutral employment practices that adversely affect minorities and cannot be justified as
necessary to an employer's business.”); Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61, 69 (3d Cir. 2017)
(“Unlike claims of disparate treatment, disparate-impact claims do not require proof of discriminatory intent.”
Instead, “[d]isparate impact redresses policies that are ‘fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.’ To that end,
disparate-impact claims ‘usually focus on statistical disparities.’”) (internal citations omitted).
76

29 U.S.C. § 623(a).
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In Smith v. City of Jackson, 77 the Supreme Court explained the “key textual differences” between
these two subsections. In particular, the two subsections treat motive differently. 78 Subsection
(a)(1) makes it unlawful to “discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s
age.” 79 This provision focuses on the employer’s motives and is the part of § 4(a) that establishes
disparate treatment claims. 80 Whereas, subsection (a)(2) targets employer conduct that “would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s age.” 81 Subsection (a)(2) “focuses
on the effects of the action on the employee rather than the motivation for the action of the
employer.” 82 Thus, subsection (a)(2) establishes a cause of action for disparate impact claims
under the ADEA. 83
E. The ADEA and Job Advertisements
In the context of recruiting and hiring, the ADEA places several limitations on the
content of job advertisements:
It shall be unlawful for an employer, labor organization, or employment agency to
print or publish, or cause to be printed or published, any notice or advertisement
relating to employment by such an employer or membership in or any classification
or referral for employment by such a labor organization, or relating to any
classification or referral for employment by such an employment agency, indicating
any preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination, based on age. 84
77

544 U.S. 228, 236 (2005).

78
See id. at 236–37 (explaining that subsection (a)(1) focuses on the motivation of the action of the
employer; whereas, subsection (a)(2) focuses on the effects of the action on the employee).
79

29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).

80

See Smith, 544 U.S. at 236.

81

29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2).

82

Smith, 544 U.S. at 236.

83

Id. at 240.

84

29 U.S.C. § 623(e).
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Moreover, an advertisement may specify age only if it “is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the . . . business.” 85 The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) is responsible for implementing and enforcing the ADEA. 86
EEOC regulations provide the following examples of terms and phrases that will violate the
ADEA if they appear in job advertisements:
•

age 25 to 35;

•

young;

•

college student;

•

recent college grad;

•

age over 65;

•

retired person. 87

Employment applications, however, may ask for the date of birth or age. 88 While inquiring as to
an applicant’s age is not a per se violation, it will be scrutinized. 89 The EEOC suggests that

85

Id. § 623(f)(1).

86

Id. § 628 (authorizing the EEOC to issue “such rules and regulations as it may consider necessary or
appropriate in carrying out” the ADEA).
87
29 C.F.R. § 1625.4(a). The Supreme Court has ruled that the ADEA does not bar employers from
favoring older workers over relatively younger ones who are also protected by the Act. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys.,
Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004). In response, on August 4, 2006, the EEOC proposed regulations making
clear that the ADEA does not prohibit employers from favoring older workers over younger workers who are also
over the age of 40. Coverage Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,177, 46,177-78
(Aug. 11, 2006). Moreover, the EEOC revised a portion of 29 C.F.R. § 1625.4(a) that barred job advertisements
favoring older persons to make it clear that it is permissible to encourage older applicants to apply. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1625.4(a) (2006).
88

29 C.F.R. § 1626.4(a).

89

Id.
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employers should use language on the application explaining that the age will not be used
unlawfully. 90
F. Federal Courts’ Response to Targeted Recruitment Practices
Although the EEOC has taken the position that specific words appearing on job
advertisements will violate the ADEA, courts have refused to adopt a per se rule for analyzing
targeted advertisements. 91 For example, in Hodgson v. Approved Personnel Service, Inc., 92 the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that “the discriminatory effect of an advertisement is
determined not by ‘trigger words’ [such as ‘young’ and ‘recent college graduates’] but rather by
its context.” 93 Accordingly, the inquiry focuses on the advertisement’s potentially deterrent effect
on older applicants. 94
Challenges against targeted recruitment efforts is not a new issue. 95 In U.S. v. Georgia
Power Co., 96 a group of employees filed a Title VII lawsuit against a private electric company,
alleging, inter alia, that the company violated Title VII by recruiting skilled personnel only at
all-white institutions. In that case, the Fifth Circuit sustained the employees’ challenge,

90

Id.

91

See Hodgson v. Approved Personnel Serv., Inc., 529 F.2d 760 (1975); see also Boyd v. City of
Wilmington, 943 F.Supp. 585, 590–91 (1996) (rejecting a claim that a job advertisement stating a preference for
“[c]andidates for MPA or MSIR” violated the ADEA); Debuhr v. Olds Prods. Co., No. 95 C 1462, 1996 WL
277644, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 1996) (ruling that a job advertisement, which stated that the employer was looking
for someone with “high energy” and “between 5 and 10 years experience” was not, by itself, sufficient proof of
intent to discriminate).
92

529 F.2d at 765.

93

Id.

Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1625.5 (suggesting that when an applicant’s age is the subject of inquiry,
employers should assure the individual that the inquiry is being made for a lawful purpose).
94

95
One of the earliest cases addressing targeted recruiting practices occurred in the context of a claim
arising under Title VII. See U.S. v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973).
96

474 F.2d at 925.
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concluding that “[t]he company’s policy of seeking skilled personnel only at white educational
institutions is . . . an invidious brake on black employment opportunities.” 97 The court reasoned
that “[w]hile the company ought not be enjoined to recruit on all college campuses[,] . . . it also
ought not be allowed to continue to restrict its recruitment programs to all—or predominantly
all—white institutions while maintaining such a racially imbalanced work force.” 98 The United
States District Court for the District of New Mexico, however, took a different approach to a
similar situation. This court approved an employer’s recruitment practice of focusing on college
campuses for entry-level positions, despite the fact that the employer is more likely to find
younger applicants in that setting than older applicants. 99 In upholding the employer’s
recruitment practice, the court concluded that “[t]here is nothing inherently suspicious about oncampus recruiting programs. . . . No evidence was presented to show whether applicants in the
protected age group had less success in finding employment at [the company] than applicants
generally.” 100
Likewise, the EEOC recently rejected disparate impact claims when the plaintiff failed to
provide evidence that a company recruited only on social media. 101 In Reese v. Salazar, an
applicant filed an age discrimination claim with the EEOC, alleging that a company’s use of

97
Id. at 926. The court ultimately held that the company must take affirmative steps to encourage black
workers, such as advertising job openings in newspapers accessible to predominantly black communities and
making public announcements that the company is an equal opportunity employer. Id.
98

Id.

99

Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., No. 74-536-M, 1977 WL 17, at *7 (D.N.M. Oct. 20, 1977), decision
supplemented, No. 74-536-M, 1978 WL 17 (D.N.M. Sept. 28, 1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds,
639 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1980), aff'd and remanded sub nom. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm'n v. Sandia Corp., 639
F.2d 600 (10th Cir. 1980).
100
Id.
101

See Reese v. Salazar, EEOC Appeal No. 0120122339, 2012 WL 5901116 (Nov. 15, 2012)
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Facebook for recruiting demonstrated the company’s intent to hire younger applicants. 102
Specifically, the applicant argued that older workers were at a disadvantage because they used
computers less often. 103 The EEOC rejected the applicant’s argument on the ground that the
applicant failed to put forth evidence showing that the company’s recruitment practice had a
disparate impact on older applicants (i.e., the employer’s use of social media for recruitment was
linked to a preference for younger applicants). 104 Further, the EEOC found that the applicant did
not present any evidence that the employer exclusively recruited through social media. 105 This
decision, and the decisions discussed below, demonstrate that a company’s use of social media as
part of a broad recruitment strategy does not violate the ADEA.
III.

PROOF OF CLAIM

Most attempts by companies to place an explicit preference against a protected group on
job advertisements have found little acceptance by the courts. Nevertheless, courts have not
addressed the scenario where companies place a preference on those who view a particular job
advertisement on a particular website. Put differently, companies increasingly place job
advertisements on social media sites that are directed towards web users—within a particular age
range—to efficiently recruit new candidates and diversify the workplace. 106 Do companies
violate the ADEA simply by targeting these web users on social media sites?

102

Id. at *2.

103

Id.

104

Id. at *5.

105

Id. at *2 (concluding that the applicant did not establish a prima facie case of disparate impact because
the applicant “failed to demonstrate that a statistical disparity existed that was linked to the challenged practice or
policy.”)
106

Evan Hessel, The Looming Battle Over Targeted Ads, FORBES (Sept. 24, 2009, 4:57 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/2009/09/24/online-advertising-privacy-business-media-regulation.html#7d291836590b.
Using targeted advertisements is also helpful for a company seeking to increase its bottom line. Id. Publishers of
news and entertainment “typically rely on third-party advertising brokers, called ad networks or ad exchanges, to
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This part of the Note proposes a legal standard modeled after analogous situations in the

context of advertisements in the mid-20th century that will provide companies with effective
guidance on recruitment standards. first argues that job applicants’ ability to bring a disparate
impact claim under the ADEA is an essential tool that is necessary to ensure that companies are
using targeted advertisements to streamline the hiring process and diversify the workplace. Next,
this Note proposes a rule that will ensure that companies, as well as potential job applicants, can
benefit from the technology used by social media sites. Thus, this Note offers a model that may
prove pragmatic enough to be met with the judicial welcomes that have been accepted by
traditional frameworks.
A. Targeted Online Advertising May Help Promote the ADEA’s Purpose.
1. Conflicting views on whether job applicants can bring a disparate impact claim under
the ADEA
Targeted advertising may help promote the primary purpose of the ADEA. Indeed, an
employer’s ability to send a targeted advertisement to a specific group, may be the most
economically efficient method of diversifying the company’s workforce. 107 At the same time,
however, older persons may be disparately impacted by the practice of targeted advertising. 108

sell more than 90% of ad inventory. . . . Behavioral targeting systems could help big publishers make their lowestpriced ads more useful for advertisers and could lift revenues.” Id.
107

See Targeted Recruiting vs. Non Targeted Recruiting, supra note 57 (“The use of a targeted job board
has inherent advantages. . . . Most evident is that a targeted job board allows you to actually pay for the applicants
you get as a result of targeting your postings. This as opposed to paying for an entire populous—with a general job
board the vast majority of candidates are not qualified let alone the candidates you are looking for.”); see also H.
KRISTL DAVISON, ET AL., FRIEND OR FOE? THE PROMISE AND PITFALLS OF USING SOCIAL MEDIA NETWORKING
SITES FOR HR DECISIONS, 155 (Springer, 2011) (explaining that the benefits of targeted recruiting include, among
other things, producing more qualified applicants).
108

See Complaint, Communications Workers of America et al. v. T-Mobile US, Inc. et al., No. 5:17-cv07232, 2017 WL 6539268 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2017). Plaintiffs may argue, for example, that targeted job
advertisements that are only displayed to those who are younger than a particular age group limits the likelihood that
those older than the particular age group will hear about those jobs; and therefore, they will be less likely to act on
those opportunities. Id. at ¶ 19, 61, 72, 82-83, 91. As a result, the older group of individuals are disparately
impacted. Id.
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When targeted job advertisements are not a part of a broader recruitment strategy, a greater
disparity of older workers may remain jobless. 109 For example, if “current employees”—and not
job applicants—are permitted to bring a disparate impact claim under the ADEA, employers will
be free to limit their applicant pool to the younger workers who viewed the advertisement.
Consequently, to ensure that the benefits of targeted job advertisements are met, job applicants,
as well as current employees, should be able to bring a disparate impact claim under the ADEA.
Although the Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the question of whether job
applicants can bring a disparate impact claim under the ADEA, lower courts have addressed this
issue. 110 In EEOC v. Francis W. Parker School, the Seventh Circuit held that the ADEA did not
cover disparate impact claims—regardless of the plaintiff’s status as an employee or applicant. 111
In reaching its conclusion, the Seventh Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s analysis in Hazen
Paper Co. v. Briggs, 112 in which the Court expressly recognized only a disparate treatment
theory of liability under the ADEA. 113 The Seventh Circuit further noted, in dicta, the major
textual differences between Title VII and the ADEA. 114 It emphasized that, although Title VII
expressly protects job applicants, the “‘mirror’ provision in the ADEA omits from its coverage,
109

The average length of unemployment for persons over the age of 55 was seven to nine months. Richard
Eisenberg, What the Older, Long-Term Worker Need, Forbes (Aug. 10, 2017 3:55 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nextavenue/2017/08/10/what-the-older-long-term-unemployedneed/#7caff34e768a.
110
See Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 961 (11th Cir. 2016); Ellis v. United Airlines,
Inc., 73 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 1994); Rabin v.
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 236 F.Supp.3d 1126 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
111

41 F.3d at 1077.

112

507 U.S. 604 (1993).

113
Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d at 1076–77; Hazen Paper Co., 503 U.S. at 609–11; see also id. at 618
(“nothing in the Court's opinion should be read as incorporating in the ADEA context the so-called “disparate
impact” theory of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964”).
114

Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d at 1077–78.
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‘applicants for employment.’” 115 Even more so, as the court pointed out, “in light of the ADEA’s
nearly verbatim adoption of Title VII language, the exclusion of job applicants from subsection
(2) of the ADEA is noteworthy.” 116 Consequently, the Seventh Circuit concluded that even if the
ADEA covered a disparate impact theory of liability, job applicants could not bring a disparate
impact claim—such a result is “dictated by the statute itself.” 117
Two years later, the Tenth Circuit addressed a disparate impact claim under the ADEA
filed by job applicants. 118 In Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., two women filed a charge with the
EEOC alleging that an employer’s hiring decisions were based on weight requirements that
disparately impacted older job applicants. 119 In an analysis similar to the Seventh Circuit’s
analysis in Francis W. Parker School, the Tenth Circuit held that the job applicants could not
bring a disparate impact claim under the ADEA. 120 Notably, in a footnote, the court explained
that “Congress expressly added applicants to the parallel provision in Title VII, but not to the
ADEA, indicating an intent that § 623(a)(2) of the ADEA not apply to applicants as § 623(a)(1)
expressly does.” 121 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit concluded that, “[b]ased on [its] interpretation
of the statutory text and congressional intent, . . . disparate impact claims are not cognizable
under the ADEA.” 122

115

Id.

116

Id.

117

Id. at 1078.

118

Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 1996).

119

73 F.3d at 1006.

120
Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1007 (“Based on our interpretation of the statutory text and congressional intent, we . . .
hold that disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the ADEA.”)
121

Id. at 1007 n.12 (citation omitted).

122

Id. at 1007.
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The trend set forth in Francis W. Parker School and Ellis did not last long. 123 In Smith v.
City of Jackson, the Supreme Court, deferring in part to the EEOC’s interpretation, effectively
overruled Francis W. Parker School and Ellis, and held that Title VII—as well as the ADEA—
authorizes recovery under a disparate impact theory of liability. 124 The Court concluded that the
only difference between those two statutes is that “the scope of disparate-impact liability under
the ADEA is narrower than under Title VII.” 125 In support of its conclusion, the Court relied on
the purpose of the ADEA and the EEOC’s interpretation of the statute, which consistently
authorized relief on disparate impact claims under the ADEA. 126
While Smith resolved the issue of whether a disparate impact claim is cognizable under
the ADEA, the Court left open the question of whether job applicants can bring a disparate
impact claim. 127 Since Smith, lower courts have struggled to arrive at a consensus on this
issue. 128 The conflict arises from courts’ interpretation of the ADEA and their decision of

123

See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 238 (2005) (plurality opinion) (clarifying that the Court’s
previous Hazen Paper decision did not preclude disparate impact claims under the ADEA).
124

544 U.S. at 240.

125

Id. at 240. See also id. (explaining that the First, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits misapplied the
Supreme Court’s Hazen Paper Co. decision; and that in Hazen Paper Co., the Court was “careful to explain that [it
was] not deciding ‘whether disparate impact theory of liability is available under the ADEA.’”).
126

Id. at 239 (noting that both the Department of Labor and the EEOC have “consistently interpreted the
ADEA to authorize relief on a disparate-impact theory.”).
127
Id. at 246 n.3 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (“Perhaps applicants for employment are covered only
when . . . disparate treatment results in disparate impact; or perhaps the agency’s attempt to sweep employment
applicants into the disparate-impact prohibition is mistaken. But whatever in addition it may cover, or erroneously
seek to cover, it is impossible to contend that the regulation does not cover actions that ‘limit, segregate, or classify’
employees in a way that produces a disparate impact on those within the protected age group[.]”) (emphasis in the
original).
128
See Champlin v. Manpower Inc., No. 4:16-CV-00421, 2018 WL 572997, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2018)
(“Smith held that section 4(a)(2) permits disparate impact claims, deferring, in part, to the EEOC’s interpretation. As
Rabin [v.PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 236 F.Supp. 3d 1126, 1132–33 (N.D. Cal. 2017)] summarizes, the EEOC
has ‘long interpreted the ADEA as permitting disparate impact claims by job-seekers.’ Conversely, the majority of
the divided Villarreal Court holds that EEOC deference is unnecessary because the plain language of the statute
protects ‘employees, not applicants.’”) (internal citations omitted).
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whether or not they should defer to the EEOC’s interpretation of the statue. 129 Some courts have
relied on Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Smith, in which she concluded that “[s]ection
4(a)(2), of course, does not apply to ‘applicants for employment,’ at all—it is only § 4(a)(1) that
protects this group.” 130 Other courts, however, have rejected Justice O’Connor’s concurrence,
finding it unconvincing. 131
In 2012, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia directly
addressed the issue of whether job applicants can bring a disparate impact claim under the
ADEA. 132 The underlying case began when an applicant, who was forty-nine years old at the
time, applied to R.J. Reynolds Company (hereinafter “R.J. Reynolds”) as a territory manager. 133
R.J. Reynolds, however, had a policy of preferring applicants who were “2-3 years out of
college” and “adjusts easily to changes.” 134 Additionally, the policy instructed R.J. Reynolds to
“stay away from” applicants who have been in sales for “8-10 years.” 135 At the time the

129

Id.

130

Smith, 544 U.S. at 266 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

131

See Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 806 F.3d 1288, 1296, reh’g en banc granted, opinion
vacated, No.15-10602, 2016 WL 635800 (11th Cir. Feb. 10, 2016), and on reh’g en banc, 839 F.3d 958, cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 2292 (“[T]here is dicta in a binding opinion and there is dicta in a nonbinding concurrence. It's
one thing to abide by dicta that is ‘three long, citation-laden paragraphs’ of ‘well thought out . . . and carefully
articulated analysis’ in a majority opinion, . . . . It's another to do the same for a single sentence in a minority
opinion”) (quoting Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308, 1325 (11th Cir.2006)).
132

Villarreal v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 2:12-CV-0138-RWS, 2013 WL 823055, at *1 (N.D. Ga.
Mar. 6, 2013), rev'd and remanded, 806 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2015), reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 1510602, 2016 WL 635800, and on reh'g en banc, 839 F.3d 958, aff'd and remanded, 839 F.3d 958, and aff'd No. 1510602, 2017 WL 2781522 (11th Cir. June 27, 2017) [Villarreall I].
133

Id.

134

Id.

135

Id.
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applicant applied, he had over eight years of sales experience. 136 Less than one week after
applying, the applicant received an email from R.J. Reynolds stating that his application was
rejected. 137 Ultimately, R.J. Reynolds hired substantially younger individuals for the position. 138
The applicant brought an age discrimination lawsuit on behalf of “all applicants for the
Territory manager position who applied for the position since the date [R.J. Reynolds] began its
pattern or practice of discriminating against applicants over the age of 40.” 139 The district court
dismissed the applicant’s complaint and concluded that, pursuant to Smith v. City of Jackson, 140
the disparate impact provision of the ADEA is limited to employees—“prospective employees”
are not protected under § 4(a)(2). 141 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s
decision and ruled that the ADEA supports disparate impact protections for both current
employees and job applicants. 142
In February 2016, the Eleventh Circuit granted a rehearing en banc, and vacated the
district court’s judgment. 143 Writing for the en banc majority, Judge William Pryor narrowly

136

Id.

137

Id.

138

Id. *1–*2.

139

Id. at *3.

140

544 U.S. 228, 236 (2005).

141

Villarreal I, 2013 WL 823055, at *5 (explaining that the applicant’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) is misplaced because “Griggs pre-dated significant
amendments to Title VII–amendments notably absent from the ADEA.”); see also id. at *6 (“when Congress
amends one statutory provision but not another, it is presumed to have acted intentionally. . . . [W]e cannot ignore
Congress’ decision to amend Title VII’s relevant provisions but not make similar changes to the ADEA.”) (citations
omitted).

2016).

142

Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 806 F.3d 1288, 1301–03 (2015) [Villarreal II].

143

Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 15-10602, 2016 WL 635800, at *1 (11th Cir. Feb. 10,
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construed the issue as “whether the [ADEA] allows an unsuccessful job applicant to sue an
employer for using a practice that has a disparate impact on older workers.” 144 Judge Pryor held
that disparate impact protections under the ADEA are strictly limited to employees. 145 In
reaching his holding, Judge Pryor analyzed the text of the statute as well as its context. 146
Specifically, Judge Pryor emphasized that the “key phrase in section 4(a)(2) is ‘or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee’” 147 And he concluded that “[b]y using ‘or otherwise’
to join the verbs in this section, Congress made ‘depriv[ing] or tend[ing] to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities’ a subset of ‘adversely affect[ing] [the individual’s]
status as an employee.’” 148 Thus, by narrowly interpreting the ADEA, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that “section 4(a)(2) protects an individual only if he has a ‘status as an
employee.’” 149 Moreover, the court refused to look into the purpose of the ADEA through
reading its legislative history because “[courts] do not consider legislative history when the text
is clear.” 150
In support of its decision, the Eleventh Circuit also pointed to section 4(c)(2) of the
ADEA, which contains language that parallels section 4(a)(2). Section 4(c)(2), unlike section

144

Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 961 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct.
2292 (2017) [Villarreal III].
145

Id. at 963.

146

Id.

147

Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2)).

148

Id.

149

Id.

150

Id. at 969.
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4(a)(2), distinguishes between “employees” and “applicants for employment.” 151 Because of this
difference, the court explained, “Congress did not leave applicants without recourse.” 152 Rather,
Congress provided applicants for employment with a cause of action under a disparate treatment
theory. 153
The Villarreal majority misinterpreted the ADEA. As a result, the court circumvented the
ADEA’s primary purpose—which is to “promote employment of older persons based on their
ability rather than age.” 154 In his dissent, Judge Martin, like the Villarreal majority, relied on the
text of §623(a)(2) to support his position. 155 Judge Martin stated that the job applicant is an
“‘individual’ who was ‘deprived of employment opportunities’ and denied any ‘status as an
employee’ because of something an employer did to ‘limit . . . his employment.’” 156 Further,
Congress interchangeably applied the term “individuals” and “employees.” 157 Congress could
have used narrower terms in § 4(a)(2); nevertheless, it chose to use the terms “‘any individual’
when referring to who can be injured by an employer’s discrimination.” 158 Thus, under Judge
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See 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)(1), (c)(2). Section (c)(2) applies to “labor organizations.” The ADEA defines
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whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours, or
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Martin’s interpretation of § 623(a)(2), current employees—as well as job applicants—can
recover under a disparate impact theory of liability. 159
Likewise, other courts have found that Judge Martin provided the correct interpretation of
the ADEA. In Rabin v. PricewaterouseCoopers, LLP, 160 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California indicated that Judge Pryor’s reading of the ADEA in Villarreal
was not supported by the natural reading of § 4(a)(2), as a natural reading plainly described the
job applicant’s situation: “[the job applicant] is an ‘individual’ who was ‘deprive[d]’ ‘of
employment opportunities’ and denied any ‘status as an employee’ because of something an
employer did to ‘limit . . . his employees.’” 161 Moreover, in Kleber v. Carefusion Corp., the
Seventh Circuit also held that Judge Martin’s reading of the ADEA was consistent with the
primary purpose of the ADEA. 162 Based on the purpose of the ADEA, the Seventh Circuit
“could not imagine . . . a plausible policy why Congress might have chosen to allow disparate
impact claims by current employees, including internal job applicants, while excluding outside
job applicants.” 163

to a set of people who were introduced earlier. And a different part of the same sentence uses the word ‘employees,’
when referring to the people an employer can’t ‘limit, segregate, or classify[.]’”).
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236 F. Supp. 3d at 1130 (quoting Villarreal III, 839 F.3d at 982 (Martin, J., dissenting)).
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Both, the majority and the dissent in Villarreal offer reasonable readings of the ADEA. 164
And both sides argue that the ADEA is unambiguous. 165 Therefore, circuit courts will continue
to reach conflicting decisions regarding the reach of the ADEA. Hence, the Supreme Court
should find the language in § 4(a)(2) is ambiguous and defer to the EEOC’s interpretation of the
ADEA in order to resolve the issue of whether a job applicant can bring a disparate impact claim.
Such a ruling would be consistent with the Court’s precedent and will result in furthering the
ADEA’s primary purpose.
2. Courts should defer to the EEOC’s interpretation of the ADEA.
The primary purpose of the ADEA is to address age discrimination in hiring. 166 While
older workers are the age group least likely to be unemployed, 167 they still experience longer
periods of unemployment and remain disproportionately represented among the long-term
unemployed. 168 Part of the reason for such disproportionate representation is because employers
are permitted to engage in subtle discriminatory hiring practices such as placing limits on
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Compare Villarreal III, 839 F.3d at 964 (majority opinion) (“By making ‘deprive or tend to deprive any
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maximum years of experience and exclusive on-campus recruiting. 169 By permitting employers
to engage in these subtle discriminatory hiring practices, courts essentially allow employers to
disregard the primary purpose of the ADEA. Despite the lower courts’ conflicting views, the
EEOC has interpreted the ADEA to allow job applicants to recover under a disparate impact
theory. 170 Consequently, the issue becomes whether courts should defer to the EEOC’s
interpretation of the ADEA.
The Supreme Court has established a two-step analysis to determine when the court will
defer to an agency’s interpretation. 171 Under the Chevron framework, a court determines whether
to look beyond the language of the statue for its interpretation in two steps. 172 First, the court
analyzes whether Congress has “spoken to the precise question at issue” directly and clearly. 173
If Congress’s intent is clear, “that is the end of the matter” as both the court and the agency
“must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” 174 But if Congress has not
directly addressed the precise issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the
statute. 175 Rather, where the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
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See Laurie A. McCann, The Age Discrimination Act at 50: When will it Become a “Real” Civil Rights
Statue?, 33 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. LAW 89, 96 (2017) (arguing that “[w]ithout the disparate impact theory to ferret
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question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute. 176
The Villiarreal en banc court demonstrated that the ADEA is a fine example of a statue
that is ambiguous. 177 For example, Judge Martin described a situation where the ADEA would
cover job applicants. 178 Suppose an employer refuses to hire a job applicant who is not in
college. According to Judge Martin, “[t]his is plainly a decision to ‘limit . . . his employees” to
college students and college students tend to be young, so this policy may ‘tend to deprive an
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual’s age.’” 179 Therefore, an older “individual” could find himself
‘deprive[d] . . . of employment opportunities” or denied any “status as an employee, because of
such individual’s age.” 180 On the other hand, if a court focuses on the phrase “or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee,” 181 the court may conclude that only current
employees can bring a disparate impact claim under the ADEA. As stated by the Villarreal
majority, “[b]y making ‘deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities’
a subset of ‘adversely affect[ing] his status as an employee,’ Congress limited section 4(a)(2) to
discrimination against employees. Applicants who are not employees when alleged
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discrimination occurs do not have a ‘status as an employee.’” 182 Because of these two conflicting
readings of the ADEA, the court should defer to the EEOC’s interpretation. 183
Under the EEOC’s regulation on the ADEA, “[a]ny employment practice that adversely
affects individuals within the protected age group on the basis of older age is discriminatory
unless the practice is justified by a ‘reasonable factor other than age.”’ 184 The EEOC has
clarified the regulation, stating that “[p]aragraph (d) of § 1625.7 has been rewritten to make it
clear that employment criteria that are age-neutral on their face but which nevertheless have a
disparate impact on members of the protected age group must be justified as a business
necessity.” 185 Accordingly, under the EEOC’s regulations, any individual within the protected
age group is able to make a disparate impact claim. 186
If courts defer to the EEOC’s interpretation of the ADEA, targeted advertisements on
social media sites may promote the primary purpose of the ADEA. Indeed, a major advantage of
social media is that users share a wide range of information with one another, which enables
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839 F.3d at 963 (majority opinion).
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The Supreme Court has continuously recognized the weight of an agency interpretation should be
accorded substantial deference when entrusted to administer regulatory schemes. See Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Cent.
Lincoln Peoples' Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 389 (1984) (“Under established administrative law principles, it is clear
that the Administrator's interpretation . . . is to be given great weight.”); Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 141 (1982)
(“the interpretation of an agency charged with the administration of a statute is entitled to substantial deference”);
see also American Paper Inst., Inc. v. American Electric Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 422–23 (1983) (“To
uphold [the agency's interpretation] ‘we need not find that [its] construction is the only reasonable one, or even that
it is the result we would have reached had the question arisen in the first instance in judicial proceedings.’ . . . We
need only conclude that it is a reasonable interpretation of the relevant provisions.” (quoting Unemp’t Comp.
Comm’n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 144, 153 (1946)).
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advertisers to efficiently and effectively reach their targeted market. 187 Advertisers can then use
the user-provided information such as age, geographic location, education, profession, and
personal connections to precisely reach the type of individuals who are likely to be influenced by
the advertisement. 188
This practice of efficiently reaching users helps advertisers control the amount of money
they spend on advertising. 189 Many employers applaud social media sites as a hiring tool because
the sites allow them to gather necessary information about job applicants; and therefore, make it
easier to predict the likely match between the applicant and the job. 190 Indeed, the ability to send
targeted advertisements to a specific demographic’s talent pool may be the best and most
economical way to diversify an employer’s workforce. 191
Of course, in practice, targeted advertisements may shield those in protected classes from
viewing advertisements. Consequently, some critics propose a total ban on targeted
advertisements. 192 As one critic stated:
Ad targeting can make the world look different to different people. Some find the
web full of job ads for high-paying CEO jobs, while others see mostly ads for
sneakers or payday loans. Our news also reaches us and our networks through ad
targeting. How can this not have huge implications for our ability to exist in a
187
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cohesive society? How can we agree on the policies that should govern our world
when there are no common reference points for what that world looks like?
Targeting, of course, does enable advertisers to efficiently reach particular
audiences with messages that are tailored to them, and that can sometimes be a
good thing. But that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t acknowledge what’s lost with that
efficiency: that people outside of the expected audiences won’t see these messages
or know they exist.” 193

In a similar vein, excluding older persons from viewing certain employment advertisements may
make it less likely that older prospective applicants will hear about employment opportunities,
and in turn, apply for or secure jobs that are open. 194 This argument, however, presumes that job
applicants cannot bring a disparate impact claim under the ADEA.
If courts allow job applicants to recover on a disparate impact theory under the ADEA,
older workers may benefit from targeted advertisements. Allowing job applicants to recover
under a disparate impact claim will act as a safeguard to ensure that employers are not using
social media sites as a tool to shield certain groups of individuals from jobs—but as part of a
broader recruitment strategy designed to reach all protected groups. Thus, employers that recruit
employees exclusively through social media sites like Facebook will be inherently suspicious
and likely found in violation of the ADEA. For example, in May 2010, a job applicant filed a
claim with the EEOC, alleging that a recruitment agency’s placement of job advertisements on
social media sites put older workers at a disadvantage because older workers use computers less
often than younger workers and therefore, are less likely to view the advertisements. 195 The
administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found that the job applicant did not establish a prima facie case
of disparate impact discrimination. 196
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On appeal, the EEOC affirmed the ALJ’s decision because the job applicant did not
present any “evidence that the agency exclusively recruit[ed] through social [media]” and
therefore, she failed to put forth evidence that the agency reserved jobs for younger applicants. 197
Accordingly, courts should defer to the EEOC’s interpretation of the ADEA and rule that job
applicants may bring a disparate impact claim under the ADEA. Under this rule, job applicants
may recover if they prove that the defendant categorically shielded them from applying to jobs
by exclusively using social media sites for recruiting purposes. 198
IV.

USING PREVIOUS CASES FOR GUIDANCE

Lower federal courts have squarely addressed the issue of targeted recruitment methods
in the context of traditional recruitment platforms. Does the outcome of those cases change when
a company uses nontraditional methods of recruiting? This part of the Note argues that placing
targeted advertisements on social media sites does not change the outcome. Thus, companies will
be able to take advantage of the abundance of information provided to social media sites to
efficiently recruit new employees.
A. Courts should Focus on the Context of Targeted Job Advertisements.
One of the earliest cases addressing targeted recruiting practices occurred in the context
of a claim arising under Title VII. In U.S. v. Georgia Power Co., 199 plaintiffs argued that Georgia
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Power’s practices of advertising vacancies within the company through word-of-mouth and
primarily recruiting at all-white educational institutions violated Title VII. In its analysis, the
Fifth Circuit acknowledged the disparity between black workers and white workers compared to
the percentage of black workers in the available labor force. 200 The court then suggested that
Georgia Power should implement other recruitment platforms that are accessible to black
communities. 201 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit concluded that “while the company obviously
ought not be enjoined to recruit on all college campuses . . . it also ought not to be allowed to
continue to restrict its recruitment programs to all—or predominantly all—white institutions
while maintaining such a racially imbalanced workforce.” 202 Thus, recruiting techniques that
focus on a particular group of people are permissible under Title VII, so long as the recruiting
platforms are also accessible by protected classes. 203
Likewise, the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, took a similar
approach in analyzing a claim arising under the ADEA. 204 In Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., the court
approved an employer’s recruitment practice of focusing on college campuses to recruit entrylevel positions, despite the fact that the employer is more likely to find younger applicants in that
setting than older applicants. 205 The court reasoned that “[t]here is nothing inherently suspicious

200
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about on-campus recruiting programs. . . . No evidence was presented to show whether
applicants in the protected age group had less success in finding employment at [the company]
than applicants generally.” 206
Moreover, when confronted with targeted job advertisements, courts have focused on the
context of the advertisements, rather than crafting a rigid per se rule. 207 In Hodgson v. Approved
Personnel Service, Inc., the court examined advertisements published by an employment agency
and held that some of the advertisements violated the ADEA while others did not. 208 In that case,
the employment agency’s advertisements used words and phrases such as: “recent college
graduate,” “1-2 years out of college,” “excellent first job,” “any recent degree,” “recent high
school grad,” “young executive,” “junior secretary,” and “junior accountant.” 209
The court's analysis of each phrase involved close scrutiny of the advertisement in its
entirety to determine whether the employment agency violated the ADEA. Specifically, the court
stated, “we are inclined to think that the discriminatory effect of an advertisement is determined
not solely by “trigger words” but rather by its context.” 210 Therefore, to determine whether the
advertisement is in fact discriminatory, the court must read the advertisement in its entirety and
consider the effects that the advertisement had on the employer's hiring practices. The mere
presence of “trigger words” does not constitute a violation of the ADEA. 211
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B. Courts Should Follow the Hodgson Court’s Analysis when Confronted with an ADEA
Claim involving Targeted Advertisements on Social Media.
Courts should adopt the Hodgson court’s analysis when addressing age discrimination

claims in the context of Facebook’s recruitment platform. In particularly, employers that use
Facebook’s technology to microtarget potential applicants should not be held, per se, in violation
of the ADEA. However, extending Hodgson’s analysis to the context of social media
advertisements raises the concern that social media’s advertisements, unlike traditional job
advertisements, shields certain users from viewing the advertisements and in turn knowing about
the open position.
This concern was sufficiently raised by the CWA. In December 2017, the CWA filed a
class action lawsuit alleging that companies that use Facebook’s advertisement platform for
recruiting systematically exclude older workers from hearing about job opportunities. 212 In its
complaint, the CWA argues that excluding older workers from receiving employment
advertisements make it less likely that older workers will apply for and secure open positions. 213
Therefore, companies that recruit prospective applicants through using microtargeted
advertisements are less likely to hire older works. 214
If the court rules in favor of the CWA, it will essentially adopt an overly rigid per se rule
that was rejected by the Georgia Power Co., Mistretta, and Hodgson courts. The court should
instead, like the Hodgson court, focus on the context of the microtargeted job advertisement,
which includes considering the effects that the advertisement had on the company’s hiring
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process and the accessibility of the advertisement through other platforms. Consequently, a
company that primarily recruits workers through microtargeted advertisements on Facebook will
run afoul of the ADEA. As discussed above, this recruitment practice can be challenged by
unsuccessful job applicants as well as current employees. In such a case, a court could take an
approach similar to the court in Georgia Power Co. and order the company to either expand its
recruitment efforts or change it.
Thus, such an analysis would allow companies to take advantage of Facebook’s
streamlined recruitment platform as part of a broad recruitment strategy designed to reach all age
groups. Moreover, Facebook’s advertisement platform allows companies to immediately and
effectively diversify the workplace.
V.

CONCLUSION

Social media sites are a fantastic invention that allows us to connect with others,
regardless of the distance. Individuals voluntarily release a tremendous amount of personal
information while using social media sites Indeed, the information that social media sites acquire
allows the software to estimate your gender, intelligence, life satisfaction, sexual preference and
political and religious preferences. 215
In the context of recruiting and hiring new employees, companies can use this
information to attract the right person for the position. Some may consider this as a “wild-wild
West” like environment, where individuals’ information is sold to the highest bidder. However,
like every other aspect of our lives, there are limitations to the permissible use of such
information. Laws, such as the ADEA, can encourage companies to efficiently use the
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information to benefit the workforce. Indeed, when implemented as part of a broader recruitment
strategy designed to reach all groups, microtargeting allows companies to target applicants from
each group who are the best fit for the company. Consequently, companies may microtarget
potential employees through social media sites as a means of hiring new employees. When
properly regulated, this method of recruiting can effectively diversify the workplace.

